This paper investigates the impact of gender quotas on firm performance using countries worldwide that have introduced a gender quota as a quasinatural experiment. Our statistical analysis shows that board members’ characteristics significantly change after implementing the gender quota. The results of our empirical analysis provide evidence that gender quotas reduce the cost of equity in the short term but decrease the Tobin’s Q in the long term and have a neutral impact on profitability in the short term and the longer term.
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We examine whether board representation of bondholders can be an effective market discipline mechanism to reduce bank risk, using a unique dataset combining information on bondholders and boards of directors of European listed banks. Our results show that the influence of bondholder representatives on the bank board significantly reduces bank risk without impacting profitability.
TRAN Phan Huy Hieu - Burgundy School of Business |
- Research
- Corporate and Market Finance